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Many ecosystems, such as rangelands, are defined
by multiple users pursuing different livelihoods and
production strategies; flexible tenure arrangements
can accommodate this diversity
In many semi-arid and arid regions where livestock is the
predominant production activity, the ability to move livestock to
different pastures is a key strategy for mitigating exposure to
erratic rainfall. Reliance on access to a wide range of pasture
resources has long been essential to the viability and sustain-
ability of such systems, as is the case in Jordan, Morocco, Syria,
and Tunisia, where rangelands receiving low and erratic rainfall
comprise a large proportion of land. In these contexts, the insti-
tutional arrangements that underpin land access and manage-
ment include state-based and herder-driven cooperatives,
community- or tribally based land titling, individually held land
titles, and joint state- and community-owned land holdings. 
In assessing the effects of these range-management mecha-
nisms on the welfare of herders and on range productivity, IFPRI
researchers found that community and herder-driven arrange-
ments perform better than arrangements involving either govern-
ment ownership or government sponsorship. It is important to
note, however, that community-driven arrangements are complex
and thus not unproblematic. In Morocco, for example, a large
proportion of recorded disputes are on common pastures, most
concerning cropping or encroachment of cultivation into
pastoral zones. In Niger, all recorded disputes concern similar
competition for pastoral resources. Thus, even in seemingly
homogeneous landscapes, interests and production systems are
heterogeneous. Flexible frameworks that provide more options
for access to different users—such as agreements for grazing on
crop fallows, along with improved mechanisms for local conflict
resolution—can help deal with this heterogeneity.
Policies that aim either to increase tenure security or
improve resource management must also incorporate potential
tradeoffs between flexible access and pasture management incen-
tives. On the whole, evidence of “overgrazing” across East Africa
is scant; such problems tend to arise in more settled areas, where
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and is still among the most important assets of the rural population in the developing
world. Land resources are governed by a variety of tenure systems based on statutory,
customary, or religious law. At the same time, many national, subnational, and local institu-
tions administer the application and enforcement of these laws, relying on a wide variety of
policies, rules, and regulations that promote different practices for using and managing land
and land-based resources. IFPRI contributes to land policy debates by demonstrating the
importance of land policy and its impact on rural people. This occurs across multiple dimen-
sions, including people’s livelihoods, the sustainability of the resource base, and the effective-
ness of the institutions that govern land. This brief summarizes findings of relevant IFPRI
research on land management and governance to promote strategies and policies targeted toward
the achievement of gender equity, poverty reduction, and sustainable resource management.
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to an anonymous reviewer who provided valuable feedback.herds appear to be less mobile. Evidence from Kenya suggests
that herd mobility is limited even in drought years. Hence,
policies to improve tenure security and resource management
should first focus on settled areas.
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Local cooperation is an important factor in the
management of commonly held resources; it also
has positive effects on household income
Unfortunately, rhetoric on the use and management of common-
pool resources still tends to be polarized. On the one hand, it is
purported that local users manage their resources perfectly as
long as “outsiders” don’t interfere; on the other hand, local users
supposedly never manage their resources, so overexploitation
results. Results of IFPRI research show that in many instances
local communities can and do manage their resources effectively,
but their capacity to do so varies widely. Research in Burkina
Faso reveals the dual nature of cooperative capacity: network
capacity—that is, the density and membership of human
networks—was seen to create greater efficiency in the delivery of
reforestation and soil erosion control measures, while implemen-
tation capacity—the rules, activities, and rates of participation in
collective action—appeared, even more importantly, to result in
greater provision of local public goods, higher shares of land in
common pastures, lower stock densities, and greater herd
mobility. Additionally, where pastures were better managed and
local public goods provided, households had significantly higher
incomes, both from livestock and in total. 
Greater cooperative capacity was generally found in
medium-sized communities with comparatively more equal
wealth distribution and fewer adults migrating for wage-based
work—all of which should reduce the negotiation and enforce-
ment costs of undertaking collective action. Other factors
affecting cooperation differ across countries. For instance,
external pressure to use community resources appears to have a
much more negative effect on cooperation in Burkina Faso and
Ethiopia than in Niger. Even though cooperation is inherently
more difficult in certain communities, well-designed implemen-
tation policies can overcome these difficulties. In these circum-
stances, current approaches to decentralizing and devolving
natural resource management need to incorporate mechanisms
that support community cooperation.
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Strengthening women’s rights to property and other
assets has positive spin-offs for agricultural produc-
tivity, household welfare, and women’s decision-
making power
In almost all countries, the gender gap in land rights has been
widening rather than narrowing. Although use rights may be guar-
anteed in some societies, women usually obtain access through
men—be it their fathers, brothers, or husbands. Indirect access to
land and pro-male bias in titling and land reform make it difficult
for women to acquire secure rights in a privatized system as well.
An IFPRI study in Kenya has shown that equalizing women’s
levels of education, experience, and farm inputs compared with
men may considerably increase their maize, bean, and cowpea
yields. In Bangladesh, new vegetable technologies targeting women
and disseminated by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are
more profitable than traditional (male controlled) agriculture and
may give women an important source of income, while increasing
their bargaining power within the household. 
Increasing the share of assets controlled by women can lead
to an increase in household welfare. In Bangladesh and South
Africa, assets in the hands of women lead to greater expenditure
on child schooling. In Bangladesh, a higher proportion of pre-
wedding assets held by the mother improves the status of women
in the households, which is likely to lead to more attention to
the health of girls. Attempts to increase women’s incomes or agri-
cultural productivity by equalizing land rights will only succeed,
however, if other constraints women face—such as lack of access
to inputs and extension, as well as time constraints due to their
domestic responsibilities—are also addressed. Finally, gender
equity in access to assets is a valuable outcome in its own right
because it can lead to greater mobility for women, increased
political awareness, and fewer incidents of domestic violence.
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Land titles can contribute to security but not 
necessarily to greater investment; securing property
rights for some can come at the expense of the
rights of others
Peru has introduced different programs to formalize property
rights to land in urban and rural areas. Studies analyzing the
effect of two of these programs found that the risk of expropria-
tion was lower after the titles were supplied. A clear gain in the
2value of the plot was also observed, thus improving investment
incentives and gains from the trade of land. Titles, however, had
no effect on land owners’ access to credit, either in terms of
amounts or interest rates. Titles are simply not enough to facili-
tate investment. Looking at the impact of the titling program on
the provision of local public goods suggests that communities
focus first on providing basic infrastructure (roads, parks,
bridges, community centers, and so on) and then move to public
utilities (such as electricity, water, and sewage). Neighborhoods
with high levels of tenure insecurity are reluctant to invest in
community infrastructure.
A major factor in China’s economic success is said to be the
secure property rights granted to investors and the easy process
through which they can obtain land. Although local govern-
ments provide partial functional substitutes for formal legal
requirements, property rights at regional levels are secure for
foreign investors. This, however, comes at the expense of indi-
vidual property rights. Local governments capture farmers’ land
at low prices, competing with each other to provide the most
favorable investment environment. Land grabbing is thus carried
out to attract investment. Industrialization and urbanization
boost land rents, expanding the prospects for local officials to
take advantage of this situation. Land can also be used to seek
(national) bank credit for local economic growth and as an input
in cadre evaluation by boosting the region’s GDP and providing
money for prestige projects. Lack of legal grievance channels spurs
unrest. In the absence of legal instruments to fight expropriation,
crisis and threat may lead to institutional reform as individuals and
groups deprived of land become stronger as a constituency.
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The legitimacy of the institutions and organizations
that govern land use and management is critical for
their effectiveness; similarly, institutional trans-
parency and accountability are necessary for
equitable land allocation and management 
In many parts of the developing world, property rights are
supported by formal legal systems, communities, customary
authorities, and programs that modify the distribution of power.
Multiple legal frameworks coexist and interact, and policies are
only as strong as the institutions that sanction them. In the
Nyando basin in Kenya there are at least 20 different sources of
national and local authority for property rights and environ-
mental governance. Most institutions do not have the capacity or
resources to fulfill their mandates, and cooperation and coordi-
nation varies considerably among agencies. Over-emphasis on
private property and ineffective regulations on private land use
limit the capacity of institutions to manage collective resources,
particularly water, effectively. In such contexts, a reassessment is
needed of how to foster alternative sources of authority that
engender legitimacy and trust and to establish local mechanisms
for conflict resolution.
In examining the processes underlying the shift from collec-
tive to individualized property systems among the Maasai
pastoralists in Kenya, a study found that declining land tenure
security was among the main factors motivating the subdivision
of collective holdings—a process that excluded women and
youth and resulted in unequal land distribution and capture by
the elite. Institutions crafted to enforce procedural rules, such as
an elected management committee, a land control board, and
even the judiciary, failed. Consequently, the management
committee was able to redistribute a large proportion of
resources to themselves and their allies, against the will of the
collective. This outcome suggests that without clear mechanisms
for enforcing transparency and accountability at different levels,
including appropriate checks and balances, it is unlikely that
equitable outcomes will be achieved in reform processes. 
An important finding of IFPRI research on land manage-
ment in East Africa is the importance of empowering local
communities by devolving authority over natural resources. In
Ethiopia, studies found that communities were more effective in
managing community woodlots when the regional government
was less involved and management was localized. A similar result
was found in Uganda, where people were more likely to comply
with natural resource management regulations enacted by local
councils rather than central authorities. 
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KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
Recognizing the complex interrelationships among
land tenure systems, resource management systems,
and human networks is essential in achieving
sustainable resource management and poverty
reduction
The research findings summarized here show that land tenure
reform will affect the implementation and enforcement of policy
instruments across local, regional, and national levels. While
broad principles may best be established at the national level,
and enforcement requires well-defined mechanisms that are
backed by the state, specific rules and regulations should respond
to cultural, political, and ecological demands at local levels and,
thus, be adopted and implemented at the lowest possible level of
governance. This also requires the recognition that external inter-
ventions never enter a vacuum; existing resource uses and the views
of interest groups and a wide range of local institutions—some of
which have evolved over centuries—must be taken into account.
Charging existing groups with new roles may well be desirable in
implementing policy reform, but overloading them could
undermine their functioning and effectiveness not only in fulfilling
new responsibilities but also in maintaining traditional ones.
Privileging individual private property is not
productive in all settings 
In some settings, granting individual property rights may be the
most effective way to secure the de facto rights of land users. At
the same time, it can lead to expropriation of rights by secondary
users, such as those with seasonal rights. Individualizing rights
often erodes systems of common property, threatening the land
rights of many poor people whose livelihoods depend on these
systems. While it is well established that secure rights for the
collective are important in common property systems, recent
research shows that security for the individual in the collective is
also very important to ensure that people are given the necessary
incentive to invest in collective resources. The achievement of
individual security within the context of a collective requires
transparency and accountability. It also necessitates an apprecia-
tion, on the part of policymakers and international agencies
attempting to induce positive change, of the context within
which institutional arrangements have evolved. 
Efforts to strengthen the land rights of marginalized
people, including women, will be more effective if
accompanied by measures to strengthen access to
other assets
Strengthening the rights of poor and marginalized people to
natural resources is essential. Having only access to land, forest,
or water does not, however, increase incomes or opportunities
because the infrastructure or capacity needed to capitalize on
these opportunities may still be lacking. Policies targeted toward
achieving efficient gender equity, poverty reduction, and sustain-
able resource management should therefore not be limited to
strengthening land access and use rights but rather focus on
improving access to education, extension services, and markets (for
the purchase of inputs and sale of produce) and on strengthening
the decisionmaking power of poor and marginalized people. 
This brief summarizes presentations made at an IFPRI workshop held
on December 15, 2005, in Washington, D.C. Stephan Dohrn
(s.dohrn@cgiar.org) is a research analyst with the Consultative Group
on International Agricultural Research’s Systemwide Program on
Collective Action and Property Rights (CAPRi), based in the
Environment and Production Technology Division of the
International Food Policy Research Institute.
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